History, Identity, and Alienation Commentary: Critical Race Theory: A Commemoration: Response by Peller, Gary
University of Connecticut 
OpenCommons@UConn 
Connecticut Law Review School of Law 
2011 
History, Identity, and Alienation Commentary: Critical Race Theory: 
A Commemoration: Response 
Gary Peller 
Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review 
Recommended Citation 
Peller, Gary, "History, Identity, and Alienation Commentary: Critical Race Theory: A Commemoration: 




VOLUME43 JULY 2011 NUMBER 5
Article
History, Identity, and Alienation
GARY PELLER
This Commentary Article sets forth a grid for distinguishing between
approaches to racial justice by diferentiating between liberal and critical
approaches in general, and between integrationist and nationalist stances
regarding race in particular. The Article then utilizes the grid to contend
that Kimberld Crenshaw and others on the left wing of Critical Race
Theory have accomplished a significant breakthrough in identity theory
and nationalist practice by articulating a critical, historicist way to
understand race. The Article then considers the criticism, lodged by some
theorists claiming postmodern sophistication, that critical race theorists
mistakenly attribute essentialist meaning to race. The Article concludes
that this anti-essentialist criticism fails to comprehend differences between
fundamentalist and critical identity projects and tends itself to assume the
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History, Identity, and Alienation
GARY PELLER*
I. INTRODUCTION
As Professor Kimberl6 Crenshaw notes in her Article, in the context of
claims that American society is now "post-racial," virtually any work that
treats race as a salient factor in social analysis has come to be associated
with "Critical Race Theory" (CRT).' Given the big-tent nature of such a
generalized designation, a template for distinguishing between works and
positions within the genre might be useful.
In this Commentary Article, I propose a rough grid for cataloguing
ideologies of racial justice. I focus on distinguishing between "liberal" and
"critical" approaches to issues of justice in general, and then between
"integrationist" and "nationalist" families of race theories. I then use this
grid to locate and distinguish the version of CRT represented by
Crenshaw's account of the movement's emergence and central
commitments, and then similarly to locate and respond to "anti-
essentialist" critiques of the project. While the structures that I describe
are simplistic and reductionist, I hope that they help highlight the unique
contribution that Crenshaw and her generation of CRT scholars have made
to social theory about race in particular, and about identity in general, and
to help identify the particular point of contention between CRT and some
of its most vociferous critics.
In her narrative of "origins," Crenshaw highlights CRT's early
engagement with white leftists (such as me) in the Conference on Critical
Legal Studies (CLS), 2 as well as its posture toward traditional civil rights
approaches. In both cases, she emphasizes "misalignments" that helped
propel the CRT project as a discursive dynamic in struggle on these two
ideological fronts.
In this Comment, in contrast, I partially focus on what was aligned and
in common between the dominant CLS project and CRT at its inception,
and the particular theoretical direction that Crenshaw and others in CRT
have since taken. I delineate a recognizable understanding of CRT-often
* Gary Peller is Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center. Thanks to Betsy Kuhn
and Matt Barsamian for their help with this article.
'Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Twenty Years of Critical Race Theory: Looking Back To Move
Forward, 43 CoNN. L. REv. 1253, 1260-61 (2011).
2 Id at 1263.
identified with "intersectionality, 3-that employs a "historicist"
interpretative methodology and that, like CLS projects, is critical of the
"neutrality" claims of liberalism and of the rule of law conception of social
justice. The fusion of a critical, historicist social and legal theory with
identity-based political and theoretical commitments is one of the historic
intellectual achievements of Crenshaw and others on the left wing of CRT.
II. LIBERAL AND CRITICAL APPROACHES TO SOCIAL JUSTICE
By the time that CRT emerged in the mid-1980s, CLS had already
been going for more than a decade.4 The CLS project focused on a critique
of the claim that there could be a sharp distinction between law and
politics. Instead, legal discourse purported to be neutral and objective but
was in fact ideological and political, resting for its neutral veneer on the
assumptions about our social life that are in fact controversial. A critical
unmasking could show the historical or analytic contingency of the "rule of
law," the manner in which law bore the marks of power.
The "critical" approaches are distinguished from liberal approaches to
social justice in this basic way. Liberals take social justice to mean the
right of individuals to be treated neutrally and objectively when subject to
collective power (through law or any other state act). The liberal
conception of justice is one of transcending bias and prejudice in the name
of rationality-one of neutral and "equal rights." The regulative ideal is to
achieve neutrality in order to guarantee individual liberty.5
Critical approaches reject as impossible if not undesirable the
universalism and individualism that liberal approaches take as their
regulative ideals. Instead, in legal studies as practiced by CLS writers, and
in many other fields under the banner of "critical theory" generally, writers
"interrogate," "unmask," or "contest" the liberal practices that purport to
be neutral and objective in order to reveal their socially, historically
constructed, contingent character, their articulated and differentiated status.
Rather than continue the liberal project of trying to transcend the
particularity of contingent social power in the name of the neutral
treatment of each individual-the project of universalism-critical
approaches see liberal discourses as themselves ideologies, as discourses
that (mis)represent the contingent exercise of social power as necessary or
neutral, and that therefore often work to legitimate rather than challenge
social injustice, and as discourses that take individuals as pre-social givens
and thereby fail to account for our social constitution.
3 See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
4 Crenshaw, supra note 1, at 1263-44.
5 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALIsM 212-54 (2d ed. 2005).
6 See Gary Peller, Reason and the Mob: The Politics of Representation, 2 TIKKUN 28, 30
(July/Aug. 1987) [hereinafter Peller, Reason and the Mob].
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III. INTEGRATIONIST AND NATIONALIST ACCOUNTS OF RACE
Whites and Blacks have historically understood race according to
different basic structures of intra-racial conflict.7
Among whites in America, the belief structure that I call
"integrationism" has dominated progressive thinking about race for over a
century, tracing its roots to the abolitionist movement. Integrationism
historically opposed and eventually came to predominate over "racist" or
"segregationist" or "white supremacist" thinking among whites.
The integrationist ideology that whites historically have embraced is
rationalistic, legalistic, and liberal. It takes race consciousness-thinking
about people in terms of their race-to be the central evil of racism.9 Race
consciousness is therefore to be avoided (except, perhaps, in order to help
remedy past racism, one of the issues that distinguishes conservative and
liberal integrationists). In this mindset, thinking in terms of race reflects a
stereotype or bias, a distortion of rationality. Being rational means being
colorblind in the sense of not making anything turn on the arbitrary fact of
skin color. Racial "discrimination" in social practices such as school
admissions and job selection should be replaced with "equal treatment
regardless of race," that is, by selection according to individual "merit."
"Segregation" should be replaced with "integration."' 0 Integrationism, in
short, imagines an ideal set of social practices and institutional cultures that
are neutral to race.
In what I am calling "liberal" integrationist approaches to race, the
problem of racism is characterized as a form of irrational discrimination
that deviates from the ideals of neutrality and objectivity-the liberal
commitment that social power should be exercised according to a neutral
and unbiased rule of law and that social goods should be distributed
according to objective merit rather than through subjective favoritism. In
the self-image of this ideology, liberal societies like ours are on a
teleological path eventually to purge racism and other distortions from the
terms upon which wealth is distributed and power is exercised. Racial
justice means achieving neutrality with respect to race, freeing racial
minorities from the pre-liberal caste systems of segregation and apartheid,
just as other reform efforts are aimed at transcending other forms of
prejudice and irrational social discrimination. Once "biases" such as racial
I develop the analysis of American racial ideologies that I describe here more fully in GARY
PELLER, CRITICAL RACE CONSCIOUSNESS: RETHINKING AMERICAN IDEOLOGIES OF RACIAL JUSTICE
(2011).
8 See Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758, 761 [hereinafter Peller, Race
Consciousness].
9 Gary Peller, Criminal Law, Race, and the Ideology of Bias: Transcending the Critical Tools of
the Sixties, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2229, 2245-46 (1993) [hereinafter Peller, Criminal Law].
1o Peller, Reason and the Mob, supra note 6, at 29.
1 Peller, Race Consciousness, supra note 8, at 778.
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prejudice are removed, selection criteria for employment or education
would be based on an objective, apolitical, or at least aracial "merit."1 2
Among Blacks, thinking about race has followed a different structural
trajectory. As Harold Cruse has stated, "American Negro history is
basically a history of the conflict between integrationist and nationalist
forces in politics, economics, and culture, no matter what leaders are
involved and what slogans are used.""
Integrationism within the African American community has had two
main, and divergent, meanings. Rather than signify the opening of
American institutions neutrally to all, as it has historically for virtually all
white liberals and progressives, many African Americans have historically
understood racial integration as more problematic because it also signified
cultural assimilation rather than liberal neutrality.14 As Professor Cruse, a
nationalist, argued, integration means assimilation, because it means
integrating into white cultural practices,15 or "the Negro ... transform[ing]
himself into a white black-man," as Robert Browne, another nationalist
intellectual, put it.' 6
Primarily among middle-class Blacks there has traditionally existed
another strand of integrationist ideology, articulated along the lines of the
Frederick Douglas/NAACP tradition that did not see integration as cultural
assimilation. 7  Like its counterpart among whites, this integrationism
consisted of a liberal, rights-oriented conception of the triumph of
rationality and equality over prejudice and discrimination, reflected in
terms of encompassing African Americans as full citizens in liberal
American democracy. The words of Martin Luther King, Jr. evoke the
idea of a day where men "will not be judged by the color of their skin but
by the content of their character." 8
As Cruse describes its class dimensions, Black integrationism is
associated with the Black middle class because that class is the only Black
group for whom such integration could seem attainable:
[T]he Negro working class has been roped in and tied to the
chariot of racial integration driven by the Negro middle class.
In this drive for integration the Negro working class is being
told in a thousand ways that it must give up its ethnicity and
12 CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT, at xiv-xix
(Kimberl6 Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
1 HAROLD CRUSE, THE CRISIS OF THE NEGRO INTELLECTUAL 564 (1967).
'4 Id. at 397-99.
15 Id.
16 Robert Browne, A Case for Separation, in SEPARATISM OR INTEGRATION: WHICH WAY FOR
AMERICA: A DIALOGUE 10 (R. Browne & B. Rustin eds., 1968).
17 CRUSE, supra note 13, at 4-6.
18 Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have A Dream, Address at March on Washington (Aug. 28, 1963),
available at http://www.mikonline.net/dream.html.
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become human, universal, full-fledged American. Within the
context of this forced alliance of class aims there is no room
for Negro art . .. or Negro art institutions . .. because all of
this is self-segregation which hangs up "our" drive for
integration.'9
The integrationist philosophy sees Negro ghettoes as
products of racial segregation that should not even exist.
Hence, nothing in the traditions of ghettoes are [sic] worth
preserving even when ghettoes do exist in actuality. This is
typical integrationist logic on all things social.20
Black nationalism, on the other hand, involves the centering of race
consciousness to identify a Black community, based on the idea that race
constitutes African Americans as a distinct social group.21 "In contrast to
the integrationist premise that blacks and whites are essentially the same,
the idea of race as the organizing basis for group-consciousness asserts that
blacks and whites are different, in the sense of coming from different
[social histories and dissimilar conditions of life]."22 Black nationalism
is different from other emergent nations only in that it
consists of forcibly transplanted colonial subjects who have
acquired cohesive identity in the course of centuries of
struggle against enslavement, cultural alienation, and the
spiritual cannibalism of white racism. This common history
which the Black people of America share is manifested in a
concrete national culture with a peculiar "spiritual
complexion," or psychological temperament. Though the
Black nation expresses its thoughts, emotions, and aspirations
in the same tongue as American whites, the different
conditions of existence . . . have, from generation to
generation, welded the bonds of a national experience as
different from that of white existence as day is from night.
And what differentiates nations from one another are
dissimilar conditions of life.23
Rather than see race consciousness as a sign of irrationality to be
transcended in the name of reason, nationalism sees in race consciousness
the historically created basis for intra-community recognition and
' CRUSE, supra note 13, at 283.
20 Id. at 234.
21 Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, supra note 8, at 792.
2 Id.
23 James Turner, Black Nationalism: The Inevitable Response, BLACK WORLD, Jan. 1971, at 7-8
(quoting C. Munford, Black National Revolution in America, Address at Utah State University (May
1970)).
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solidarity, as a ground of social, cultural, and artistic meaning rather than
as a distortion of reason.24 Race is, in short, a frame of identity.
At the outset, nationalism appears categorically more critical than
integrationism because the nationalist positions are united in rejecting the
21ideal of achieving racial or cultural neutrality in social practices.
Integrationism appears as the dominant frame for liberal race ideologies,
and nationalism for critical race ideologies.
Within integrationism, one can identify a spectrum of positions. First,
as noted above, one wing of the integrationist position conceives of racial
integration as assimilation to dominant cultural practices. According to a
traditional strand of nationalist discourse in the Black community, much of
the Black middle class has come to believe in the superiority of white
26
culture and desires to assimilate into it through integration. Among
whites, this kind of non-liberal integrationist position was represented by
"melting pot"27 sociological theories of cultural assimilation, non-liberal
because proponents made no pretense of presenting the dominant culture as
in any way just, in the sense of being neutral to race or ethnicity.28
Today, openly assimilationist articulations of integrationism are
virtually non-existent and would likely be marginalized as a form of
cultural imperialism. Instead, integrationist ideology is predominantly
liberal in the broad sense of the term described above, and the liberal
integrationist ideology overwhelmingly dominates public discourse and
debate. Racial justice is conventionally framed as a commitment to end
discrimination in the name of equal opportunity "regardless of race." But
there are also liberal and critical tendencies within the liberal integrationist
framework itself. For example, there is disagreement among liberal
integrationists over how to identify continuing racial bias and what
24 Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, supra note 8, at 761 ("[B]lack nationalists asserted a positive
and liberating role for race consciousness, as a source of community, culture, and solidarity to build
upon rather than transcend.").
25 Gary Peller, Notes Toward a Postmodern Nationalism, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 1095, 1096, 1099
[hereinafter Peller, Notes].26 See EDWARD FRANKLIN FRAZIER, BLACK BOURGEOISIE: THE RISE OF ANEW MIDDLE CLASS IN
THE UNITED STATES 130-49 (1957) (describing the forces that led to feelings of inferiority among
middle-class Blacks and the "quest for status").
27 For a discussion of the origin of the metaphor and the assimilationist conception that it
represented, see GARY GERSTLE, AMERICAN CRUCIBLE: RACE AND NATION IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 51 (2002).
28 The roots of the idea that overcoming racism would mean integration, understood as
assimilation, can be found in academic thought in a widely influential study by Robert Park. See
generally ROBERT PARK, RACE AND CULTURE (1950) (describing a structure of race-relations based on
distinct stages of contact, competition, accommodation, and assimilation). Park's basic model was
somewhat refined by Louis Wirth. See generally Louis Wirth, The Problem of Minority Groups, in
THE SCIENCE OF MAN IN THE WORLD CRISIS 347, 347-72 (Ralph Linton ed., 1945); see also NATHAN
GLAZER & DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, BEYOND THE MELTING POT 20-22 (1963); MILTON M.
GORDON, ASSIMILATION IN AMERICAN LIFE 62-66 (1964) (discussing Park's definition of
assimilation).
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measures to take to remedy it.29 The conservative wing of contemporary
integrationism insists on a narrow definition of what constitutes racial
discrimination-the constitutional requirement of intent, for example-
while a more critical wing advocates for a broader definition-advocating
an impact rather than intent standard for equal protection. The
conservative wing of integrationism takes colorblindness as the definition
of racial justice and therefore opposes racial affirmative action, while a
more critical wing advocates the need for race consciousness in order to
remedy the broader effects of racial discrimination that it identifies.30
Conservative integrationists tend to depict discrimination as a thing of the
past. More critical integrationists emphasize "structural" discrimination
and "unconscious" racism. Integrationists decry the nationalist position as
"self-segregation." 3 Nationalists decry integrationism as assimilationism. 32
The nationalists also encompass competing camps. Nationalist
ideologies can themselves be distinguished by how "critical" they are with
respect to the boundaries of identity, whether that identity be of the "Black
community" or of the "white community."
At one end, I would describe a family of right-wing nationalist
discourses that, like CRT, are anti-liberal in the sense of not being oriented
toward the achievement of neutrality to race, and yet they must be
classified as the least "critical" of nationalist ideologies. They are properly
understood as "racialist" in the sense that they take racial categories as pre-
given starting points for analysis rather than seeing racial categories and
identities as themselves socially constructed and contested.33 Racialist
theories seek to depict various exercises of power in society as explicable
in terms of a straightforward understanding of racial interests, much like a
form of "vulgar Marxism" is traditionally accused of reducing complex
social relations to class interests.
At the opposite end of the nationalist category, I would describe left-
wing, critical discourses such as CRT. In my description, the critical wing
of nationalism is identified by "historicism" with respect to the terms of
nationalist identity, seeing them as contingent, socially constructed, and
contested rather than simply given. From the historicist perspective,
racialist approaches "essentialize" the group's characteristics into a form of
fundamentalism about the group's identity, characteristics that are
supposed to exist outside of the contingencies of history and geography.34
I would categorize the Nation of Islam and various Afro-centric
29 See Peller, Notes, supra note 25, at 1096.
30 See id.
" CRUSE, supra note 13, at 283.
32 See id. at 283-84.
33 See CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 12, at xxiv; Peller, Race Consciousness, supra note 8,
at 794 (identifying racial relations as a social creation).
34 Peller, Race Consciousness, supra note 8, at 794.
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movements in the same manner: they attempt to ground African American
identity in essential, timeless characteristics. The Nation of Islam seems to
posit patriarchy as an essential trait. The Afro-centric movements tend to
posit an essential African cultural heritage that was distorted by the
American experience.3 s
The more critical nationalist discourses do not try to universalize the
characteristics of racial and other communities, but rather take the common
culture that ties a community together as the contingent result of historical
contestation, as something open to future political transformation.36  I
would categorize as representing this historicist, left-wing of nationalist
thought the analyses of Harold Cruse, Malcolm X, much of the discourse
of the Black Panthers, and, for reasons that I discuss below, the faction of
CRT reflected in Crenshaw's approach.
IV. NATIONALISM MEETS LIBERAL INTEGRATIONISM
In the 1980s law school context in which CRT emerged, the ideology
of liberal integrationism was hegemonic. 37  Mainstream legal discourse
about race in constitutional and discrimination law was conducted entirely
on integrationist premises, with racial justice conceived as the attempt to
identify, remedy, and compensate for the irrational use of race in the
distribution of social benefits and burdens, that is, to purge selection
criterion of stereotype and prejudice in the name of merit and reason.3
Debate consisted of how narrow or wide to identify when racial
discrimination had taken place (the debate over whether to require intent or
impact)3 9 whether to use race in order to remedy past racial
discrimination,40 and how widely to enforce remedies. To the extent that
the "civil rights" tradition that Crenshaw alludes to was represented in law
schools, it fit easily within the conventional discourse, as the more critical
wing of integrationism unwilling to believe prematurely that racism had
been rooted out of social practices.
I hope that this background helps to put into relief the enormous
historical significance of Derrick Bell that Crenshaw highlights. In the
mid-1970s, Bell's staunch assertion of a nationalist understanding of race
was jarring. In Serving Two Masters, he questioned the ethical ground of
liberal integrationist lawyers who advocated school busing to achieve
integration when Black parents preferred better funding for Black
" Id. at 818-19.
36 Id at 819.
" Id. at 758-59.
1 Id. at 769-770.
3 Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 12, at 235, 236-37.
40 Peller, Race Consciousness, supra note 8, at 776.
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schools. 41  His Race, Racism and American Law casebook opened with
Thomas Smith and John Carlos giving the Black Power salute at the 1968
Summer Olympics in Mexico City, and the organizational premise of the
entire book was to view law from the perspective of its impact on racial
42 th
minorities, particularly African Americans. Bell thus rejected the
conventional organization of legal casebooks around doctrinal categories
such as "equal protection." Instead he took for granted that race
consciousness was a legitimate lens through which to interpret and think
about law. He made the theory explicit with the publication of his
"interest-convergence" thesis, organizing a positive and predictive theory
of doctrinal change by attention to the diverging and converging interests
of separate white and Black communities. 43
In my analysis, Bell represents the first wave of CRT, in that his work
reflects the open articulation of a race-conscious scholarly perspective in
direct challenge to the liberal integrationism of prevailing doctrine,
ideology, and law school culture. The key dramatic feature of his
interventions was the assertion of a nationalist account of race in the face
of liberal integrationism that characterized both legal doctrine and
scholarly convention." His stance was illiberal because he asserted that
what was taken to be neutral and objective in liberal sensibilities-
colorblindness, scholarly standards-were really reflections of white
culture and white power.
V. NATIONALISM MEETS CLS
At the point of the initial CRT engagement with CLS, white leftists
like those in CLS were for the most part ignorant of the Black nationalist
tradition, or at least did not see its connection to the critical project that
occupied white leftists. For the most part, the white left was deeply
integrationist and tended to think of the race issue in terms of whether
individuals had racist ideas or acted in racially discriminatory ways.45
41 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 471-72 (1976).42 DERRICK A. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (5th ed. 2004).
43 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93
HARV. L. REv. 518, 523 (1980). Richard Delgado's The Imperial Scholar had the same effect of
introducing a nationalist, race-conscious perspective to challenge the hegemony of the integrationist
ideology. By demanding a race-conscious accounting of constitutional law scholarship, he is
impugning the liberal, colorblind conventions of scholarship and law simultaneously. See Richard
Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV.
561, 561-66 (1984).
" CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 12, at xix-xxi.
4 This was not exclusively true. Prior to the emergence of CRT, Alan David Freeman, a
prominent crit, had written an influential work showing how anti-discrimination law worked to
legitimate race discrimination. His work emphatically rejected the "bias" construct of racial power in
favor of an account of structural racism. And his work was emphatically critical (in fact, among the
classic early CLS texts) in seeing legal discourse as a site of power and ideological legitimation rather
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CLS scholarship was involved in trying to show that the liberal rule of
law was really inherently political and that presenting it as neutral and
objective suppressed its socially and historically constructed character.
Within that broad project, a central theoretical preoccupation within CLS
in the early to mid-1980s was the competition between the "tilt'" 6 and
"indeterminacy' 7 positions as to whether legal doctrine was "tilted" to
serve class interests or too indeterminate to serve that function. By the
mid-1980s, the "indeterminacy thesis" was dominant. Its central claim was
that, for the same reasons that legal doctrine was too indeterminate to serve
as an objective and neutral base for the rule of law, it was not determinate
and coherent enough to explicate through structures of interpretation such
as class analysis.4 8 The tilt/indeterminacy debate49 provided the theoretical
background within which many in CLS perceived gender and race
interventions with suspicion, as similarly vulnerable attempts to posit a
determinate structure for social analysis that exists itself outside the social
field. If class didn't work to provide a determinate structure for
interpreting the vectors of social power, why should gender or race?
Now, to re-describe the alignment of CLS and the early racecrits: CLS
and the racecrits were aligned in the rejection of a liberal, and the embrace
of a critical, stance toward social practices-whether they be the "rule of
law," the "market," or definitions of "merit" for job and school selection.
The early racecrits were aligned with CLS in the rejection of liberalism, I
think, because of independent engagements with race politics,50 in which
they had already adopted a nationalist perspective on race and had already
rejected the colorblindness of liberal integrationism in favor of race
consciousness, an identity-based rejection of the universalist assumptions
of liberal universalism." Identity nationalists like Crenshaw were attracted
than as the transcendence of power in the name of reason. While his work moved well beyond an
individualist account of racial power and was well to the left of any liberal rule of law, he remained for
the most part in the integrationist tradition in the sense of conceiving of the problem of racial power as
"discrimination." See Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Anti-
Discrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1102-03
(1978).
46 See, e.g., Wythe Holt, Tilt, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 280, 285-86 (1984).
47 See, e.g., Charles M. Yablon, The Indeterminacy of the Law: Critical Legal Studies and the
Problem of Legal Explanation, 6 CARDozo L. REV. 917, 929-31 (1985).
4 1 d. at 917-18.
49 That debate was eclipsed in the mid- to late-1980s by the femcrit insurgency, which was soon
followed by the race intervention, both of which Professor Crenshaw describes. See Crenshaw, supra
note 1, at 1290-92.
s
0 Id. at 1295.
s1 I should make clear that much of the work does not fit cleanly in one or another of the
categories. Richard Delgado's groundbreaking work, The Imperial Scholar, exposed that American
scholarly discourse about constitutional law was conducted among an all-white group of scholars who
cited each other exclusively. Delgado, supra note 43, at 561-62. It was not totally clear how much
Professor Delgado intended to flow from that fact, however. The article might have been interpreted to
make an integrationist point about the wrongful bias against work of scholars of color, along the lines
that those scholars were also qualified to engage in the discourse that the white scholars were engaged
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to CLS ideologically because of a shared interest in unmasking the claims
of liberal integrationists to neutrality and objectivity, CLS from a general
"law is politics" critique of legal ideology and the emerging racecrits from
the nationalist orientation critical of claims that the "rule of law" was
racially neutral.52 Crits and emerging racecrits were aligned in pursuing
critiques of liberal claims to neutrality. They were misaligned, however, in
part because, with respect to race, the crits for the most part had not
developed particularly critical approaches and instead embraced the same
liberal integrationist ideologies that distinguished liberal and progressive
whites from racist whites. Moreover, the idea of using race as a category
for interpreting social power seemed subject to the same indeterminacy
critique that the crits had pointed to in liberal claims to neutrality.54
Within CLS, then, distinct positions emerged with respect to the early
efforts to articulate a critical race discourse. Alan Freeman represented a
transition point within CLS. He formulated a kind of "critical
integrationism" by applying critical methodology to analyze the law's
failure to realize integrationist norms.55 Duncan Kennedy, Mary Jo Frug,
and this author helped constitute another CLS faction embracing the kind
of critical identity projects that the emerging CRT left, led by Crenshaw
and others, was articulating.56  But a significant cohort of crits either did
not engage with the race discourse at all, or reacted negatively. As critics
saw it, by using race as a structure for analysis, the emerging racecrits were
engaged in racialism, which the crits equated both with white supremacists
and Black nationalists of the sixties and seventies whom they had similarly
dismissed. While this early criticism from some within CLS initially
in. On the other hand, Delgado also suggested the more nationalist, less liberal point that the
substantive content of contributions from scholars of color would be different. Id. at 564 n.15.
Similarly, Charles Lawrence's groundbreaking article, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection,
supra note 39, at 237, emphasized the ways that racism might be at work unconsciously given the
manner in which individuals have been socialized. The image of racism Lawrence used seems to be
the integrationist notion of prejudice and stereotype distorting reason. Does that put Lawrence in the
integrationist camp? I don't think so, but it is clear that there is some dissonance between his overall
nationalist focus, embodied in his political practices and scholarly focus, and the particular, seemingly
integrationist manner in which he articulates racial power. Perhaps he should be understood, like Alan
Freeman to represent a kind of "critical integrationism."
52 Crenshaw, supra note 1, at 1308.
54 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1363, 1371 (1984) ("[T]he
language of rights is so open and indeterminate that opposing parties can use the same language to
express their positions. Because rights-talk is indeterminate, it can provide only momentary advantages
in ongoing political struggles.").
ss See supra note 45.
56 See Mary Jo Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1045 (1992);
Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705; Peller, Race
Consciousness, supra note 8.
57 This account of methodological and ideological disagreement does not capture the occasionally
vehement discourse that some in this crit faction used to reject the emerging race discourse. See, e.g.,
Mark Tushnet, The Degradation of Constitutional Discourse, 81 GEO. L. REv. 251 (1992). I have
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seemed to be rooted in an uncritical, liberal take on race, it eventually
developed into the purportedly postmodern critique of anti-essentialism
that I discuss below.
At this point, it is possible to identify the particular intervention that
early CRT work played in terms of the theoretical structure of race
discourse, the subject of the following section of this Commentary Article.
VI. BURNING DOWN THE (MASTER'S) HOUSE
There was two kind of slaves. There was the house negro
and the field negro. The house negros, they lived in the
house, with master. They dressed pretty good. They ate
good, cause they ate his food, what he left. They lived in the
attic or the basement, but still they lived near their master,
and they loved their master, more than their master
loved himself. They would give their life to save their
master's house quicker than their master would....
. . . If the master's house caught on fire, the house
negro would fight harder to put the blaze out than the master
would. If the master got sick, the house negro would say
"What's the matter, boss, we sick?"
We sick! He identified himself with his master, more
than the master identified with himself.. . . And if you came
to the house negro and said, "Let's run away, Let's escape,
Let's separate," the house negro would look at you and say,
"Man, you crazy. What you mean, separate? Where is there
a better house than this? Where can I wear better clothes
than this? Where can I eat better food than this?"
On that same plantation, there was the field negro. The
field negros, those were the masses. There was always more
negros in the field as there were negros in the house. The
negro in the field caught hell. He ate leftovers. In the house,
they ate high up on the hog....
The field negro was beaten, from morning til night. He
lived in a shack, in a hut. He wore old, cast-off clothes. He
hated his master. I say, he hated his master. . . . When the
house caught on fire, he didn't try to put it out, that field
negro prayed for a wind. For a breeze. When the master got
speculated on the psycho-social context of this vehemence in Gary Peller, The Discourse of
Constitutional Degradation, 81 GEO. L. REv. 313 (1992).
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sick, the field negro prayed that he'd died. If someone come
to the field negro and said, "Let's separate, let's run." He
didn't say "Where we going?" he said "Any place is better
than here."
--Malcolm X (1964)58
I intend the above grid to be particularly useful in a political analysis
of competing race approaches by focusing attention on the extent to which
each might tend either to legitimate or challenge status quo social practices
and mainstream accounts of racial power. I believe that the focus on the
difference between liberal and critical accounts of race is important
because of the tendency of liberal discourse not only to be reformist-
working to remove racial biases in social practices-but also to be
apologetic-tending to legitimate as fair and just social practices once the
biases of racism and other distortions are supposedly removed. In the race
context, for example, one can question whether "merit" is something
acultural and aracial, a neutral way to distribute social benefits, or whether
it is itself a political, contestable concept. Are "merit," "reason," and
"neutrality" part of what Malcolm X refers to as the "master's house," or
are they the transcendence of social power that they purport to be?
Part of the compelling appeal of Malcolm X was the clarity and the
confidence with which he spoke, and particularly the unabashed way in
which he categorized the world in terms of Blacks and whites in the face of
a dominant American discourse about race that insisted that his race
consciousness was indistinguishable from that of white supremacists. His
description of "house negros" and "field negros" embodies key elements of
the historicist Black nationalist position that I associate with the most
"critical" of nationalist approaches. In addition to finding the roots of
contemporary Black culture in the slave history of African Americans,
rather than in an imagined origin of African purity, Malcolm X also
historicized the culture and social practices into which Blacks were seeking
integration as those of whites-"the master's house." His articulation
reflected the traditional suspicion that the Black working class has had
toward the integrationist aspirations of the middle class while clearly
setting forth the critique that integration did not mean the achievement of
civic and social equality, but rather the assimilation into white cultural
norms. His invocation of the over-determined identification of the house
negro with dominant social practices of the master ("We sick! He
identified with his master more than the master identified with
himself. . . .") captures a traditional nationalist critique of the manner in
which members of the Black middle class seeking to "integrate" lacked
58 MALCOM X SPEAKS: SELECTED SPEECHES AND STATEMENTS 10-11 (George Breitman ed.,
1990).
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critical distance about the claims of what the nationalists call white culture.
For my methodological purposes, the very structure of his class/cultural
differentiation of African Americans suggests a critical rather than racialist
perspective: rather than depict the African American community in unitary,
static terms, Malcolm X describes tension and conflict within the
community, and frames the context in historical (albeit purposefully
simplistic) terms.
In my view, the distinguishing and historic contribution of CRT has
been to bring the kind of critical nationalist analysis of race that had been
articulated in the 1960s and 1970s by Malcolm X, the Black Panthers, and
others, to the world of scholarship and theory.
As Crenshaw frames it, critical nationalists arrived in mainstream law
schools in the 1970s and 1980s (often out of African American and Ethnic
Studies programs) just as the law schools began seriously to pursue racial
integration of their student bodies and their faculties.59 If they were
politically radical and interested in developing a critique of the manner in
which legal ideology falsely represents social power as the mere
application of reason, students of color were attracted to CLS. But they
found that the white left at the time had virtually no analysis of race at all,
and the analysis of the indeterminacy of rules and principles seemed to
leave no room for a racial analysis. The only available discourse focused
on race was the traditional civil rights ideology of integrationism, which
rejected the race consciousness and the critical, rather than liberal, stance
to which the students of color were committed.60
While Bell's work may have shattered the first obstacle by
dramatically introducing race consciousness into constitutional analysis, it
did not necessarily represent the introduction of a critical nationalist
perspective. Bell's analysis could be regarded instead as predominantly
"racialist" in that it took the existence of racial communities as a given,
rather than as collectivities whose culture and dynamics were contestable
and contingent. Bell's early work was nationalist, and thus more critical,
in my terms, than any integrationist approach in that it was not oriented to
finding and perfecting neutrality and objective rules for social relations.
Bell emphasized that institutions into which Blacks would be integrated
were not racially neutral but rather bore the marks of white cultural
s Crenshaw, supra note 1, at 1263.
6 Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, supra note 8, at 760 ("[M]ainstream race reform discourse
reflects . . . a tacit, enlightened consensus that integrationism-understood as the replacement of
prejudice and discrimination with reason and neutrality-is the proper way to conceive of racial justice,
and that the price of the national commitment to suppress white supremacists would be the rejection of
race consciousness among African Americans.").
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norms.6 1 But, for the most part, Bell did not problematize the communities
whose interests his race theory deployed.
The grid that I have described clarifies, I hope, the kind of structural
discursive contestation that forged the particular and unique discourse that
became CRT. Crenshaw's generation faced a discourse "misalignment"
with both the liberal intergrationism of the civil rights tradition-which,
even though it focused on race issues, had no place to contain the race
consciousness of their nationalism-and with the critical left-who had
developed a critique of liberal claims to neutrality generally but had, like
virtually all progressive whites, embraced an integrationist view of racial
justice.
The "intersectionality" idea is one significant face of this turn toward a
critical rather than racialist nationalism. 62 Crenshaw's "intersectionality"
intervention in race and gender discourses simultaneously embraced the
nationalism that Bell had courageously articulated while rejecting the
racialism that Bell's work arguably embraced. One dramatic way to
historicize as partial the social practices into which Blacks would integrate
was to introduce gender power as a racially contestable issue. In other
words, from a critical nationalist perspective, the integrationist movement
did not simply mean the assimilation of Blacks to white culture but more
specifically meant the integration of Black men into the world of white
men, so that Black men could enjoy the same gender power that white men
enjoy. Not only did such an analysis tend to call into question the overall
neutrality of the culture at the base of the integrationist position, but it also
made a historicist point with respect to racial integration itself-to the
extent that gender relations in the Black community were not the same as
those in the white community, integration would not only proceed on male
terms, but specifically on the gender terms of the white community.
The "intersectionality" idea, highlighting the socially articulated,
contingent quality of community characteristics, not only historicized the
practices that integrationists expected Blacks to integrate into, but also
61 See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 110,
(1987) (discussing RAY C. RiST, THE INVISIBLE CHILDREN: SCHOOL INTEGRATION IN AMERICAN
SOCIETY (1978)). Bell states that
Rist ... followed ... a group of young Black children bused to an upper class,
mainly white school. The principal's policy was to "treat all the kids just alike."
This evenhanded policy meant-in practice-that the handful of Black children
from the ghetto were expected to perform and behave no differently than did the
white children from comfortable suburbs in this mainly white school where the
curriculum, texts, and teaching approaches were designed for the middle-class white
kids. As you can imagine, the results of this evenhanded integration were
disastrous.
Id.
62 Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins, Identity, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43
STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1244 (1991) (discussing the concept of intersectionality).
63 See id
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historicized the Black community itself. Crenshaw showed that the
interests of the Black community tended to be articulated in terms of the
interests of Black men, and thus took as normal, rather than contingent,
patriarchy as a defining feature of the Black community.64 The racialism
commonly associated with the nationalist tradition takes the Black
community, more or less, as a historical given rather than a socially
constructed and contingent entity whose terms of construction present
political questions. Crenshaw's utilization of "intersectionality" focuses
attention on the manner in which the identity of any identity-based
community is in flux and contestable. The same historicism that applies
to the liberal categories of merit and reason is applied to the racial terms of
critique itself.
VII. RACIAL IDENTITY AND ESSENTIALISM
Difference discourse does precisely the opposite: in
reacting against the punishment of difference, it reinforces
the insistence that racial differences are intrinsic and real.
This is more than the recognition of group identification
born as a collective response to social prejudice. It is the
production of identity as a lifestyle, a way of being. . . . [a]n
easy solidarity, a V.I.P. pass to belonging....
The necessary correlative to this unearned solidarity is an
unwarranted presumption about the entailments of group
membership.... This political correctness requires and duly
produces opprobrium for people who miss their cue: we
encounter "Oreos"-blacks on the outside who don't "act
black" and therefore presumably aren't black on the
inside . . . . These figures of scorn imply that there is a
particular type of behavior that is appropriate to a given race,
and thereby censure deviation from it. ...
This message not only provides ready justification for
continued bigotry . . . it also encourages group members
themselves to emphasize their difference from outsiders . ...
The idea that minorities should hew to "their" cultural
traditions is just as hegemonic as the idea that they should
64 See id. at 1251-52.
6s Id. at 1245.
6RiCHARD THOMPSON FORD, RACIAL CULTURE: A CRITIQUE 35 (2005).
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assimilate to a mythical white-bread mainstream.
--Richard Ford, Racial Culture: A Critique
(2005)
I hope that recognizing the particular theoretical achievement that I am
associating with Crenshaw and others on the left wing of CRT-the
dialectical articulation of Black nationalist and critical positions-will help
put in relief the "essentialism" critique that has been made by some against
the project.
Liberals object to the manner in which posing any identity to a
community such as, say, "African American" is racist in that it irrationally
attributes characteristics on the "arbitrary" basis of skin color. For liberals,
identity-based approaches render race essential rather than recognizing it as
arbitrary. Because identity frames such as race and gender present the
possibility of bias, they are to be avoided as irrational ways to perceive and
represent the social world. Early on, liberals reacted to the identity-based
starting points of CRT work with this kind of critique.
A similar critique has been made by those who claim to have
transcended the limits of liberalism in favor of "post-modem"
sophistication. They contend that race is socially constructed and therefore
not a determinate basis for social analysis. Race is simply a social
"performance," 69 not an objective or necessary characteristic of people.
In the remainder of this Commentary Article, I analyze the
essentialist critique of CRT. I utilize Richard Ford's recent critique of
"racial culture" as exemplary of both liberal and non-liberal responses; his
discourse contains both, or perhaps shows one collapsing into the other.
Ford basically contends that, because there is no essence to race, nothing
"real and intrinsic" beyond "group identification born as a collective
response to social prejudice," nationalist assertions of racial identity are
"hegemonic" and oppressive.
Ford's criticism provides another way to illustrate the unique
theoretical ground that the left faction of CRT seeks to traverse. The
critical nationalist theoretical project faces a fundamental tension that may
be easier to see when nationalism is recast as an identity project. The
problem, stated abstractly, is this: What can "identity" mean to a critical
practice that denies the possibility of social practices transcending time and
space? If an identity like "African American" is socially constructed from
moment to moment in its various performances and if it has no objective
reality (no "essence") separate from those performances, then what does it
6 1 Id. at 39-41.
*See generally Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1745 (1989).
69 FORD, RACIAL CULTURE, supra note 66, at 61-64 (citing JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE:
FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990)).
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mean to talk of an identity at all?70 After all, identity means being the
same over two points in time and/or space, and, if there is no essence to
identity, there can be nothing to mark what is the same over time, nothing
to recognize as the same from moment to moment and context to context
as (so-called) "identity" groups are constructed and articulated.
As I see it, Ford has taken an anti-essentialist critique that might apply
to the fundamentalist wing of nationalism and applied it to "difference
discourse" generally. Ford's mistake is that he fails to recognize the
differences in methodology and analysis among identity or nationalist
approaches. His critique accordingly ignores the historicist stance that
distinguishes critical nationalists such as Malcolm X, the Black Panthers,
and the left wing of CRT from racialism as articulated by groups such as
Nation of Islam.
The theoretical project for many in CRT is precisely to conceive of an
identity like "the Black community" in a postmodern/historicist way, one
that honors "its" contingent, socially constructed, nonessentialist, and
performative status while nevertheless asserting identity as meaningful, as
presenting in fact no determinate, stable meaning but rather a surplus of
meanings and multiple tracks of coherence-a "postmodern nationalism,"
one could say, or more generally, a "social subjectivity."
I think that some leftist critics of nationalism-as Richard Ford
presents himself-mistake the significance of the postmodern critique of
identity. The adherents to this current of "liberal postmodernism"
comprehend groups like "African Americans" as not "real" because their
identity is socially, historically created and contingent. What "African
American" means has no necessary content and could be vastly different in
the future, or in a different place. Ford, for example, spends major parts of
two books showing that particular assertions of cultural identity are not
essential, but contingent, and therefore cannot be objectively demonstrated
to be a part of any essential cultural identity--e.g., a white woman can
wear cornrows.n But he rejects the possibility that identity may be no less
meaningful even if it is historical, contingent, hybrid, and dialectic, rather
than "intrinsic and real."72
The tendency of this strand of self-professed postmodernism 73 is to
revert to liberal individualism, say, to colorblindness about race, on the
ground that racial culture cannot be objectively identified. The embrace of
70 For a summary of the traditional philosophical literature on the relationship between identity
and essence, see Stephen Yablo, Identity, Essence, and Indiscernibility, 84 J. PHIL. 293, 293-300
(1987).
71 See FORD, RACIAL CULTURE, supra note 66; RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, THE RACE CARD:
How BLUFFING ABOUT BIAS MAKES RACE RELATIONS WORSE (2008).
72 FORD, RACIAL CULTURE, supra note 66, at 35.
73 See id. at 61-64 (citing JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION
OF IDENTITY (Routledge ed., 1990)) (adopting notion of racial identity as a performance).
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postmodern terminology is significant because it signifies that the critique
purports also to reject liberal individualism in favor of more radical
epistemological premises. Despite the theoretical veneer, though, this
stance posits a traditional modernist subject anterior to identity who
chooses identity like a commodity-"a V.I.P. pass"-and who is then
subject to opprobrium when the social discipline of the group is imposed.74
The whole sense of wrong that Ford wants to assert depends on the sense
that an individual is being made the object of collective power, that is, the
very center of liberal, not postmodern, sensibilities. The critique of such
an ahistorical, free-standing subject who chooses between social structures
has been the focus of much postmodernism work already.
Ford fails to account for the fact that the content of the group's identity
is one of the terms of struggle within groups, between traditionalists and
fundamentalists who assert a stable, ahistoric, essential group identity, and
the historicists and revolutionaries who understand that the terms of group
identity are never fixed and always up for grabs, being constantly copied,
reproduced, and necessarily changed in every iteration, articulation, and
performance.
Ford's objection to the policing of identity by "censure"76 is really an
objection to the policing function of any culture, of any language, of any
social system for conferring meaning whatsoever. He posits a radically
free (liberal) subject on whom the disciplinary apparatus of group identity
is imposed after he chooses to align with one or another group. But such
a being is an ideal, or, more literally, a monad. He does not exist. People's
very existence entails being defined (and defining others) in terms of social
languages external to themselves, but which depend on them for any
continued life, on the exercise of "social subjectivity." 78
Ultimately, I think, Ford's work on race is an attempt to rationalize as
normal the alienation that members of a group may feel once they no
longer can see themselves in the group, so that they no longer experience
"its" identity as a social subjectivity. Instead, like the workers' products in
the Marxist version of alienation, group identities become reified,79 so that
74 Id at 39.
7 See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN ARCHEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN
SCIENCES (1973); see also HERBERT L. DREYFUS & PAUL RABINOW, MICHEL FOUCAULT: BEYOND
STRUCTURALISM AND HERMENEUTICS (1983).
76 FORD, RACIAL CULTURE, supra note 66, at 39-40 ("These figures of scorn imply that there is a
particular type of behavior that is appropriate to a given race, and thereby censure deviation from it.").
" See id. at 59-61.
7 Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1151, 1249 (1985)
(discussing the category of "social subjectivity" as one categorically eliminated by liberal metaphysics
of the subject/object dichotomy).
7 See generally KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (Frederick Engels,
ed. 1906) (Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling, trans.); Georg Lukics, Reification in the Consciousness
ofthe Proletariat, in HISTORY AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS (Rodney Livingstone trans., 1968).
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"African American culture" assumes a "phantom objectivity" -a fixed
essence separate from what any group member might do or not do. But
Ford's evocation of the power of opprobrium and censure to police the
identity group's borders treats the disciplinary apparatus as if it had a life
separate from its performance by the group's members, and therefore not
subject to struggle and contestation from the inside. In short, he describes
being alienated from a form of social power because, as he describes it,
African American culture exists separate and independent from him and
thus might be chosen or be imposed on him. He does not see himself as
part of a community identity and he does not conceive that he could affect
its future. He posits a subject, somehow constituted independent of all
such social identities, who is censured by an external group that he has lost
any hope of influencing, and who is "discriminated against" because he is
perceived as raced even when he wants to play other roles.
This kind of "'postmodern" account not only naturalizes the structure
of Black identity, but also treats social space in general as aracial once the
demands of the "difference discourse" have been rejected. He ignores the
traditional African American critique of integration as assimilation by
assuming away the possibility that it is not just the Black community that
is curtailing his liberty, but white culture as well, with its restrictions and
disciplines. Like the traditional position of integration minded members of
the Black middle-class, he is invested in translating assimilation as liberty
by ignoring the possibility that the space into which he seeks access
without having to suffer opprobrium is white space, a terrain where
culturally specific performances of "standards" and "merit" have been
staged by whites to justify the exclusion of others.
The anti-essentialist rejection of identity discourse posed by Ford and
others, though clothed in the trappings of postmodernism, constitutes a
rejection of postmodern critique. The anti-essentialists attack racial
categories with deconstructionist vigor to expose their lack of fixed, stable
meaning and their historically-contingent character. That the categories
lack essential characteristics leads the anti-essentialist to conclude that they
are, at best, invalid, and, at worst, an illegitimate imposition on members
of the race. If race cannot be defined (or confined) objectively as
something other than a historically-contingent product of otherness, as a
space with policed boundaries and a center from which one is not to stray
too far, the anti-essentialists posit, then it cannot exist at all. Ford insists
on a deterministic, structuralist conception of race as a regime of rules and
norms that exists above and beyond and before the subjects it describes,
rather than as a discursive formation, perpetually in flux, constantly shaped
and reshaped by the performances of the subjects themselves, which are its
so Lukacs, supra note 79, at 135.
"' See id at 116.
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only constitutive elements. Individuals do not wear a pre-fabricated,
inherited racial identity, but instead race itself is defined by those
performing within it.
I do not read Crenshaw and others in the CRT genre to contend that
the Black community has a stable, essential identity over time or across
space; instead, what it means to be Black in America is constantly
articulated and rearticulated through every performance that constitutes
that community, from the inside and from the outside. But that just does
not mean there is no such social group. A multiplicity of meaning is not
the same thing as a lack of meaning. In fact, this understanding of
"identity" is arguably the "true" post-modem position, not the reversion to
liberal individualism that Ford and other postmodern critics of the
"essentialism" of CRT and other identity based projects perform.
The African American community exists as a group and can be
followed through time and space even if the group can never be objectively
and definitively defined; even if its borders are continuously contested;
even if its meaning is multiple and indeterminate. It is true that the group's
existence is partly constituted by performances, in which the group is
produced by being articulated and rearticulated. It is true that the group
may be constituted very differently in the future, or maybe not "exist" in
the future at all. But that contingency does not make the group less real.
In existential terms, then, I would say that Ford and others are making
the converse mistake of traditional metaphysics. Rather than assert that
there are essences that precede existence, and of which existence was a
deteriorated version of the ideal, they treat the lack of an essence to social
groups as if that meant that they have no existence, either. The picture of
"the Black community" I am trying to evoke sides with the existentialist
tradition that it is coherent to assert the existence of African Americans
82
without positing an essence to the group.
VIII. CONCLUSION
I have tried to provide a grid for cataloguing and understanding the
theoretical and political structure of race discourses generally, and the
place of CRT in particular, in order to amplify Crenshaw's description of
the discursive situation from which CRT emerged. In this account, the
central theoretical project of CRT emerged as the need simultaneously to
reject the liberalism of traditional civil rights discourse, from which an
alignment with critical discourses was and continues to be helpful, and yet
to reject the denial of the possibility of identity that the critical practices
82 The idea that "existence precedes essence" is a central tenet of existentialist philosophy. The
slogan was coined by Jean-Paul Sartre. JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, L'EXISTENTIALISME EST UN HUMANISME
[EXISTENTIALISM IS A HUMANISM] (Carol Macomber trans., 2007) (1946).
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suggest. As I see it, the left wing of CRT, represented by Crenshaw and
others, has developed a "critical nationalism" that represents a structural
advance over the false universalism of liberal race discourses and over the
fundamentalist essentialism of many traditional nationalist manifestations
(in fact, of many identity-based approaches generally). This is an historic
achievement in the history of social theory.
